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RECENT DECISIONS 
EXTRATERRITORIAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
COAST GUARD POLICE POWERS IN FOREIGN 
TERRITORIAL WATERS: WHAT PRICE EXPANSION? 
- UNITED STATES v. CONROY 
A recent decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals1 has 
greatly broadened the authority of the United States Coast Guard 
to apprehend domestic vessels suspected of drug smuggling and 
other illicit operations. The reasoning behind this expansion of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction was based on a te.nuous precedent. 
In United States v. Conroy, a United States Coast Guard cut-
ter, pursuant to information supplied by a Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) informant, attempted to apprehend the American 
sailboat Nahoa in international waters. The Nahoa chose to turn 
and run for sanctuary in nearby Haitian waters. To the surprise of 
her crew,2 the Nahoa was pursued and subsequently subdued by the 
threat of cannon fire in waters within Haitian territorial limits. The 
Coast Guard successfully pursued the Nahoa into Haitian territorial 
waters after first obtaining permission by radio from the Haitian 
Chief-of-Staff. After consent to an inspection had been refused, 3 a 
boarding party combed the Nahoa and uncovered and seized 7,000 
pounds of marijuana.' The defendants protested that without a war-
rant and without express statutory authority to conduct a search 
within foreign waters, the Coast Guard had exercised powers that 
1. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 594 F.2d 241 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
2. Id. at 1267. The court, citing P. JESSUP, THE LAw or TERRIToRIAL WATERS AND MARITIME 
JURISDICTION 120 (1927), recalled the traditional law of the sea doctrine that foreign warships 
did not "enjoy an absolute legal right to pass through a state's territorial waters." 
The Nahoa undoubtedly set course for Haitian waters in reliance on this doctrine without 
realizing that it had become outdated. 
3. The Coast Guard may apprehend and board any vessel under the American flag; such 
authority is plenary and need not be founded on any particularized suspicion. Once on board, 
the Coast Guard may conduct documentation and safety inspections. If, during the course of 
such inspection, circumstances arise which generate probable cause to believe that a violation 
of United States law has occurred, the Coast Guard may search, seize, and make arrests. See, 
14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976); Tariff Act of 1930 § 581(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976); U.S. CONST. 
amend. 4. 
4. The enforcement provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 prescribed penalties and fines 
for the transportation of marijuana and other contraband. 19 U.S.C. § 1584 (1976) states, in 
part: "If any of such merchandise so found consists of smoking opium, opium prepared for 
smoking, or marijuana, the master of such vessel . . . shall be liable to a penalty of $25 for 
each ounce thereof so found." 
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neither Congress nor the Constitution had conferred upon it. 5 
The Court was unimpressed by this argument. 6 It conceded that 
under normal lie-in-wait situations a search warrant would have 
been the minimum requirement for such an invasion of the defen-
dant's seacruise. 7 Nevertheless, the Nahoa did not follow normal 
hailing procedures, which would have been to identify herself and 
submit to an inspection of the captain's log and safety devices. 
Instead she fled in an obvious attempt to obtain sanctuary in foreign 
territorial waters, thereby evoking an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of warrantless searches based on the exi-
gency of the· suspect's uncontrolled mobility.8 The DEA informant's 
information having supplied the requisite antecedent probable 
cause, the Coast Guard had sufficient reason to pursue the Nahoa 
in order to secure and preserve instrumentalities of the suspected 
crime.9 
The most remarkable element of Conroy is the judicial recogni-
tion of certain Coast Guard powers as viable and affirmative within 
the jurisdictional waters of another sovereignty .10 Two Fifth Circuit 
5. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976); U.S. CONST. amend. 4. The language of the enforcement 
provision of the Coast Guard Act refers only to the "high seas," and does not expressly 
mention foreign territorial waters as being open to Coast Guard police activities. 
6. 589 F.2d at 1268-1269. 
7. Id. at 1269. 
8. Id. See, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1923). 
9. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 594 F.2d 241 
(5th Cir. 1979); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132 (1923). 
10. Although the Supreme Court has held that the United States has legislative author-
ity over its citizens on the high seas and in foreign territory, no decision has extended this 
power to territorial waters of a foreign sovereign. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 
(1952) (the United States possesses authority to regulate trademark infringements by an 
American citizen in Mexico); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949) (Congress possesses 
the authority to control overtime pay of workers in the employ of American contractors in 
Iran and Iraq, but it did not intend to exercise its power). 
In addition, the Tariff Act of 1930 allows examination of foreign vessels without the 
customs waters of the United States by customs officers pursuant to a "special arrangement" 
with the foreign government. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1587 (1976). Close examination of 14 U.S.C . 
§ 89(a) (1976) indicates no such open-ended grant of authority to the Coast Guard in terms 
of domestic vessels. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: 
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, 
and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdic-
tion, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United 
States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any 
time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any 
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's 
2
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decisions decided a year earlier embodied the spirit of the expansive 
holding in Conroy. United States v. Warren 11 and United States v. 
Cadena 12 both interpreted the Coast Guard enforcement provisions 
found in section 89(a) of title 14 of the United States Code. Section 
89(a) extends the Coast Guard's authority to detain, board, and 
search domestic vessels believed to have violated laws of the United 
States on the high seas. 13 Both cases held that the Coast Guard had 
authority to search on the high seas under section 89(a) by reason 
of its reliance on "the jurisdiction, or . . . operation of any law of 
the United States."14 Neither the Warren nor the Cadena opinions, 
both concerning high seas searches and seizures of marijuana, so 
exceeded the scope of their respective circumstances as to suggest 
that suspected smugglers could be sought out in foreign waters. 
In so enlarging the geographical boundaries of the Coast 
Guard's authority to conduct searches of domestic vessels, Judge 
Rubin, writing for the Fifth Circuit in Conroy, relied on implicit 
legislative history, not on express statutory language. 15 The opinion 
also relied on the United Nations-sponsored Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Convention), 16 to which the 
United States and Haiti are signatories. 17 The fact that the exercise 
of Coast Guard powers took place within the Haitian territorial sea 
seemingly placed no great burden on the court. By virtue of the 
doctrine of innocent passage, incorporated into Article 14 of the 
Convention to permit innocent passage of foreign warships not en-
gaged in combat, 18 the Coast Guard was, according to the court, 
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all 
necessary force to compel compliance. 
11. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978). 
12. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978). 
13. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), supra note 10. 
14. Id. (emphasis added). See, 578 F.2d at 1069; 585 F.2d at 1257. 
15. In regards to 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976), Judge Rubin said: 
Because neither mandate nor prohibition of search can be divined from Section 
89(a), the Coast Guard's authority, if it exists, must be ... an incident of its other 
powers .... The pattern of legislation from 1790 to 1927 traced by Mr. Justice 
Brandeis [concurring in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927)] and the subse-
quent Congressional action . . . make it clear that, in the absence of objection by 
the sovereign power involved, Congress intended the Coast Guard to have authority 
to stop and search American vessels on foreign waters . . . even though it never said 
so with unequivocal didacticism. 589 F.2d at 1266-1267. 
16. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 
15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter 
cited as the Convention]. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. Article 14 of the Convention, supra note 16, provides in relevant part: 
3
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acting within the scope of its duties. Since Article 14 permits the 
unannounced entrance of all ships into territorial waters, 1!1 Judge 
Rubin concluded that the implicit authority of section 89(a) of title 
14 of the United States Code20 permitted the Coast Guard to con-
duct its duties as it would on the high seas. 
The court's oblique interpretation of the Convention raises the 
question of whether there is a possible jurisdictional flaw in its 
decision to sanction police powers extra territorially. 21 Regardless of 
whether or not the Convention permits foreign warships to inno-
cently ply a nation's territorial sea, 22 it neither expressly nor im-
pliedly expands jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign beyond limits 
currently in effect. 23 Although the Coast Guard had implied permis-
1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal 
or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either 
of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal 
waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters. 
4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with 
these articles and with other rules of international law. Convention, supra note 16, 
15 U.S.T. at 1610. 
The Conroy opinion claims that "[n]o distinction is made between warships and other 
vessels." 589 F.2d at 1267. Coast Guard vessels can therefore ply foreign territorial waters for 
the reasons set forth in Article 14(2) and ( 4) of the Convention. Contrary to the court's claim, 
the Convention does distinguish warships from civilian or other government vessels. Article 
23 contemplates coastal state action against foreign warships if Article 14 is not upheld: "If 
any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State concerning passage 
through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it, the 
coastal State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea." Convention, supra note 
16, art. 23. 
19. Convention, supra note 16, art. 14(1). 
20. 589 F.2d at 1267-1268. 
21. The Convention addresses the situation that occurred in Conroy in Article 19(5), 
which provides virtually unbridled freedom of passage through a coastal state's waters by a 
merchant ship: 
The coastal State may not take any steps c:in board a foreign ship passing through 
the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion 
(sic) with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, 
proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without 
entering internal waters. Convention, supra note 16, art. 19(5). 
Regardless of how the court weighed Mr. Justice Brandeis' influence on the legislation 
of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) through his concurrence in Maul v. United States, supra note 15, Coast 
Guard authority thereunder appears geographically exhausted by the term "high seas." Had 
Congress anticipated extending the authority to conduct searches into foreign territorial 
waters, it could have indicted it in more explicit terms. 
22. Supra note 18. 
23. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977), involved the reversal of a 
conviction of an American citizen for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 
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sion to pass through Haitian waters, section 89(a) of title 14 of the 
United States Code does not automatically apply. Rather, section 
89(a) extends only so far with respect to the "high seas" as expressed 
in its terms. 
A more concrete ground for extension of the authority to search 
extraterritorially is barely recognized by the court: the Haitian 
Chief-of-Staff's explicit, oral authorization of the pursuit of the 
Nahoa amounted to consent to a Coast Guard search in Haitian 
waters. 24 The court gave only nominal weight to this, which was 
possibly the most sound basis for authority available. 25 
Authority for the Coast Guard's mere presence in Haitian wa-
ters is secure under Article 14 of the Convention. However, author-
ity for the Coast Guard's exercise of police activities, based solely 
on its presence and an "implicit recognition by the United States 
Government of the power of its warship to make the search, "26 cre-
ates an unreliable precedent in the area of the law of the sea. In a 
similar situation, where express consent to an extraterritorial deten-
tion and search is withheld, courts will be hard-pressed to apply the 
Conroy decision and rationale. Rights of innocent passage are not 
by capturing dolphins within the three-mile limit of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. 
That legislation was held to extend authority to control the behavior of American citizens to 
the high seas, but not to the territory of other nations. A presumption is raised against 
extraterritorial application of a statute, the nature of which does not mandate extraterritorial 
application. This presumption is overcome by a clear showing of congressional intent. Id. at 
1002. 
The Conroy court confidently relies on Justice Brandeis' closing to his concurrence in 
United States v. Maul as authority to search into foreign territorial waters. Examination of 
the Maul decision indicates that the Justice's opinion suggests authority to search "no matter 
what the place of seizure." Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 531 (1927). However, his 
concurrence in toto considers only the high seas, not expressly the territorial waters of a 
foreign sovereign. Consequently, the "high seas" terminology of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) does not 
clearly indicate the broader congressional intent found in the Conroy court's holding, as 
required by the Mitchell standards. 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 44(1)(b) (1965). 
25. The court found authority to conduct the extraterritorial search by essentially relying 
on one provision of the Convention: the "implicit authorization for its warships to do what 
the warships of other nations might do," derived from Article 14 of the Convention. 589 F.2d 
at 1268. No authority is given for this interpretation of warship operations under the Conven-
tion. 
Yet stricter scrutiny is invited by the court's suggestion that, even without such implicit 
Coast Guard authority, the defendants had no case. Absent the implicit authority mentionE:d, 
the court "would still be compelled to conclude that the defendants cannot assail the legality 
of their seizure .... [R]edress for improper seizure in foreign waters is not due to the owner 
or crew of the vessel involved, but to the foreign government whose territoriality has been 
infringed by the action." The Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815). 
26. 589 F.2d at 1268. 
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readily reshaped to mandate an exercise of foreign police activity, 
the authority for which hangs by a thread of tenuous legislative 
guidance. 
William Little 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING - REPUDIATION OF 
CONTRACT AND ENFORCEMENT OF LETTER OF 
CREDIT AGREEMENTS - AMERICAN BELL INTERNATIONAL, 
INC. v. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, BANK IRANSHAHR, AND 
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST COMPANY 
The recent political upheaval in Iran has created multifarious 
problems between the Islamic Republic, the new governing force in 
Iran, and American multinational corporations holding contracts 
with the deposed Imperial Government. The results of these con-
flicts are beginning to reach our courts. The ensuing litigation will 
determine, within the context of banking agreements, important 
legal issues between the principles and their respective banks. Cor-
responding considerations involve the enforcement of contractual 
obligations in a modern world pervaded with the intractable politi-
cal problems of individual states. These considerations are acquir-
ing important legal precedential status in the international spec-
trum. 
Recently, a federal district court1 applied the Caulfield criteria2 
to deny a preliminary injunction to enjoin a bank from paying the 
amount demanded under a Letter of Credit. The importance of this 
decision is enhanced by the fact that the Iranian government was 
both the party demanding payment under the Letter of Credit and 
1. American Bell International, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Bank Iranshahr and 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, No. 79-3904 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Bell]. 
2. Caulfield v. Board of Education, 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978). In Caulfield, the United 
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, recently clarified the standard for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction. The Caulfield case concerned a federal district court's denial of a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin the mandatory answering of ethnic questionnaires. In deny-
ing the plaintifrs motion, the Caulfield court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
Id. at 610. 
The court in the Bell case made findings of fact and law concerning probable success on 
the merits and the seriousness of the litigation. Bell, supra note 1. 
6
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the party whose breach of contract made the demand callable. The 
case raises serious questions with respect to the future involvement 
of American companies in the more unstable nations of the world. 
The decision may have the impact of deterring involvement by 
American companies otherwise willing to invest substantial funds 
and effort to contract with foreign governments. The fear that 
American courts will apply nebulous balancing standards that may 
impair these companies' equitable and contractual rights may have 
a chilling effect on dealings with foreign states. The recent decision 
affecting American Bell International, Inc. demonstrates this prob-
lem. 
On July 23, 1978, plaintiff American Bell International, Inc.,3 
entered into a contract with the Imperial Government of Iran to 
provide consulting services and advanced equipment to develop 
Iran's nationwide telecommunications system. The contract pro-
vided for a total payment of $280,000,000 to Bell, including a down 
payment of $38,800,000. The down payment was callable upon de-
mand by the Imperial Government with a 20 percent deduction of 
the amounts invoiced by Bell. At the date of the subsequent breach, 
$30,200,000 of the down payment remained callable. Under the 
terms of the contract, Bell was required to secure an unconditional 
and irrevocable Letter of Guaranty4 for $38,800,000, to be issued by 
the defendant Bank Iranshahr to the Imperial Government of Iran. 5 
In return for issuing a Letter of Guaranty to Bell, Bank Iranshahr 
required Bell to obtain a standby Letter of Credit6 in favor of Bank 
lranshahr in the amount of $38,800,000. The Letter of Credit was 
issued by defendant Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company.7 
3. Bell is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Telephone & Telegraph Company. 
4. A Letter of Guaranty is generally defined as a collateral promise or undertaking by 
one person to answer for the payment of some debt or the performance of some duty (in case 
of default) of another person liable therefore in the first instance. Cargill, Inc. v. Buis, 543 
F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1976). 
5. The parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Iranian courts to settle any 
disputes arising out of the contract. 
6. A Letter of Credit primarily provides an assurance to the selling party of prompt 
payment against documents. It defines the terms of conditions upon which, and only upon 
which, the payment will be made, and which, within the strict limits of those terms and 
conditions, engages the full primary responsibility of the bank to make payment. Venizelos, 
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1970). For a good general discus-
sion of how a Letter of Credit agreement operates in the sphere of international banking, 
American East India Corp. v. Ideal Shoe Co., 400 F. Supp. 141 (D.C. Pa. 1975). In Bell, the 
Letter of Credit was required to secure reimbursement to Bank Iranshahr if it was required 
to pay the Iranian Government under its Letter of Guaranty. 
7. The standby Letter of Credit provided for payment by Manufacturers Hanover to 
Bank Iranshahr upon receipt of the following: 
7
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Bell commenced performance under the contract, providing 
services and equipment pursuant to its obligations.8 In January 
1979, the Islamic Republic overthrew the Imperial Government. 
This resulted in a repudiation of all contractual obligations by Iran 
and left Bell with substantial unpaid invoices for services rendered. 
Bell subsequently ceased performance and on February 16, 1979, 
brought an action9 against Manufacturers Hanover in the Supreme 
Court, New York County, seeking a preliminary injunction prohibit-
ing Manufacturers Hanover from honoring any demand for payment 
under the Letter of Credit. The motion was denied on March 26, 
1979 and was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, First 
Department. 
On August 1, 1979, Manufacturers Hanover notified Bell that 
a conforming demand10 had been received. The following text is an 
examination of the decision rendered by the United States District 
Court, Southern District of New York, denying Bell's new motion 
for a preliminary injunction. 
The court decided this motion in light of the tests set forth in 
Caulfield v. Board of Education. 11 The court in Caulfield held that 
there must be "a showing of possible irreparable injury and either 
Your [Bank lranshahr's] dated statement purportedly signed by an officer indicat-
ing name and title or your Tested Telex Reading: (A) 'Referring Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Co. Credit No. SCl 70027, the amount of our claim $represents funds 
due us as we have received a written request from the Imperial Government of Iran 
Ministry of War to pay them the sum of under our Guarantee No. issued for the 
account of American B-el1 International, Inc. covering advance payment under 
Contract No. 138 dated July 23, 1978 and such payment has been made by us' . . . . 
Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 3. 
In the application for the Letter of Credit, Bell agreed immediately to reimburse Manu-
facturers Hanover for all amounts paid by Manufacturers Hanover to Bank Iranshahr pur-
suant to the Letter of Credit. Id. 
8. The evidence presented to the court indicated that Bell sent numerous invoices for 
services and equipment, but had received only partial payment at the time it ceased perform-
ance. Id. 
9. Bell brought its action before a demand had been made by Bank Iranshahr for pay-
ment under the Letter of Credit. Id. at 4. 
10. On July 25 and 29, 1978, Manufacturers Hanover received demands by Tested Telex 
from Bank lranshahr for payments of $30,220, 724 under the Letter of Credit, the remaining 
balance of the down payment. Asserting that the demand did not conform with the Letter of 
Credit, Manufacturers Hanover declined payment and so informed Bank lranshahr. Informed 
of this, Bell responded by filing this action and an application, by way of order to show cause, 
for a temporary restraining order, engendering this motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Following argument, the court granted a temporary restraining order on July 29th enjoining 
Manufacturers Hanover from making any payment to Bank lranshahr until forty-eight hours 
after Manufacturers Hanover notified Bell of the receipt of a conforming demand, and the 
order extended pending decision of this motion. Id. 
11. 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978). 
8
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(1) probable success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious ques-
tions going to the merits to make it fair ground for litigation and a 
balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting 
the preliminary relief."12 
First, the court considered whether Bell would be suffering irre-
parable injury if no preliminary injunction was granted to enjoin 
Manufacturers Hanover from paying on the Letter of Credit. 13 The 
court considered two contentions14 in rendering its decision and 
found for the defendants in both instances. Bell asserted that it had 
no effective remedy or legal recourse if payment was made because 
it must institute suit in Iran pursuant to the jurisdictional agree-
ment by the contracting parties. 15 This, Bell claimed would result 
in a hopeless submission to Iranian law as interpreted by Iranian 
courts. 16 The court recognized the fact that Iranian authorities had 
reached a zenith of anti-American fanaticism and the likelihood17 
that an Iranian court would objectively uphold an American multi-
national corporation's contract rights against the state was incred-
ibly remote. 18 The court held, however, that Bell failed to demon-
strate that it was without adequate remedy under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity Act. 19 In so holding, the court did not discuss 
12. Id. at 610. 
13. See Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 5. 
14. Bell only claimed that it would be precluded from suing in Iranian courts. It did not 
assert that it would be unable to sue Manufacturers Hanover in American courts. The court 
notes that Bell's failure to show why it would be prevented from suing Manufacturers Hano-
ver, for violation of the Letter of Credit, in American courts constitutes insufficient grounds 
for a proper showing of irreparable injury. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. Bank Melli, No. 79-1167 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1979) 
for a general appraisal of the current situation in Iran and the effect it is having on American 
companies' assertion of contract rights with Iranian entities. 
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (Supp. 1979) provides: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in 
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act outside the territory 
of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that 
act causes a direct effect in the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1979) provides: 
(b) [A]ny property in the United States of an agency of instrumentality of a 
foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not be im-
mune from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment 
9
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the probable outcome if the decision had been rendered against the 
Iranian state. Ordering Iran to repay the funds received under the 
Letter of Credit, following a successful suit by Bell in the American 
courts, would arguably present problems similar to the admittedly 
futile act of bringing suit in the Iranian courts. Manufacturers Han-
over, having lost to Bell in an American court, would be forced to 
sue Iran to recover its loss, thus encouraging the very kind of inter-
national problem that the district court was trying to avoid.20 
The court, having concluded that Bell failed to demonstrate 
irreparable injury, 21 turned to the second22 Caulfield test to deter-
mine if grounds existed for granting the preliminary injunction. 
Under that test, the plaintiff must have shown, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that either a demand for payment on Manufactur-
ers Hanover's Letter of Credit had not been made, 23 or that the 
demand, although in conformity, should not be honored because of 
fraud24 in the transaction. The court effectively precluded granting 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this 
Act if-
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality 
is not immune by virtue of § 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5), or § 1605(b) of this 
chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was used for the activity 
upon which the claim is based. 
20. Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 5. 
21. Id. 
22. Caulfield requires a plaintiff, upon failing in his attempt to show irr~parable injury, 
to demonstrate probable success on the merits. 583 F.2d at 610. 
23. This requirement concerns whether the demand is in strict conformity with the 
Letter of Credit. For a general discussion of strict conformity, see 425 F.2d at 465. 
See Bell, supra note 1, slip op. at 6, which sets forth the facts upon which the court 
dispenses with the discrepancy between the amount in the demand and in the Letter of 
Credit. The court found the dissimilarity between the named beneficiaries on the two docu-
ments to be irrelevant. Id. at 7. 
The court dismissed any contention that the new Iranian Government had any right to 
demand payment under a Letter of Guaranty, payable only to its predecessor, by setting forth 
the long-held proposition that American courts traditionally view contract rights as vesting 
not in any particular government, but in the state for which that government is an agent. 
Furthermore, the United States Government has officially recognized the Peoples Islamic 
Republic as the legal successor to the Imperial Government of Iran, a recognition binding on 
American courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938). 
The court speculated that probable chaos would result if American courts commenced 
finding nonconformity in international financial agreements only because the incumbent 
government of a foreign state changed in makeup or ideology. Bell, supra note l, slip op. at 
7. 
24. The court dismissed Bell's contention that the Iranian Government perpetrated a 
fraud by repudiating the contract and subsequently demanding enforcement of the Letter of 
Guaranty, thereby tainting the Letter of Credit called by Bank Iranshahr. The grounds for 
dismissal rested on the law of contract damages and the requirement of proof of fraudulent 
10
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of the preliminary injunction on the grounds of nonconformity or 
fraud, and left Bell with the third and final basis on which to seek 
injunctive relief. 
Under the third alternative test of Caulfield, a plaintiff may 
seek a preliminary injunction on the grounds that (1) sufficiently 
serious questions going to the merits make them a fair ground for 
litigation, 25 and (2) the balance of hardship tip decidedly toward the 
plaintiff. 28 It is the court's analysis of this third basis which raises 
some interesting considerations concerning the potential effect on 
future economic involvement in politically volatile countries. Here, 
the court applied a balancing test before holding that the admit-
tedly serious and complex hardships involved did not tip against the 
plaintiff Bell. 27 The court r~asoned that Bell was a large and sophis-
ticated multinational corporation aided by competent counsel. Bell, 
well aware of the intricacies of international business agreements, 
voluntarily signed a contract with the Iranian Government allowing 
Iran to recoup the down payment on demand without regard to 
cause. Iran merely had to call the Letter of Guaranty to effectuate 
the banking process which ultimately required Manufacturers Han-
over to pay Bank Iranshahr the down payment upon receipt of the 
conforming documents28 without regard to cause. The court ex-
tended its balancing test by listing the potential benefits29 which 
would have accrued to Bell upon completion of the contract. The 
court did not consider the fact that, because of a breach of the 
contract by the Iranian Government, none of the potential benefits 
intent. The court noted that absent proof that Iran would refuse to pay damages upon breach 
of contract, it would not presume fraudulent intent. The court observed that the law of 
contract damages presumes that one who repudiates has done so because of a calculation that 
such damages are cheaper than performance. This would constitute a nonfraudulent eco-
nomic calculation by the Iranian Government to reclaim its down payment regardless of the 
reason or consequences. The court held that this was nonfraudulent conduct. Bell, supra note 
1, slip op. at 10. 
25. Id. at 11. 
26. Id. 
27. The court conceded that Bell would probably lose $30,200,000 guaranteed in the 
Letter of Credit, but countered it with the potential risks of Manufacturers Hanover. Those 
risks include the possibility of being sued by Bank Iranshahr and having $30,200,000 of its 
assets in Iran attached to guarantee payment, the possibility of consequential damages, the 
possibility that an irate Iranian Government may order its banks to attach all Manufacturers 
Hanover's assets within Iran far above the amount in suit, and a loss of credibility in the 
international money and banking community by failing to execute a valid Letter of Credit. 
Id. 
28. Id. at 12. 
29. The court stated that Bell stood to gain a large monetary profit from the contract 
itself and an economic benefit commensurate with the international goodwill elicited by 
designing and installing a nationwide telecommunications system. Id. 
11
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were actually realized by Bell. Bell's loss was described as an in-
stance where "one who reaps the rewards of commercial arrange-
ments must also accept the burdens."30 One of the burdens was the 
risk that they would lose the down payment without cause. As a 
consequence of having found that all the equitable considerations 
weighed against Bell, the court refused to grant a preliminary in-
junction. The court reached their decision knowing that both Bell 
and Manufacturers Hanover were innocent victims31 of interna-
tional events beyond their control and that neither was guilty of any 
breach under the contract-a contract repudiated without cause by 
the new Iranian Government. The district court's decision and cor-
responding analysis merit careful consideration. Finally, in the legal 
context, the long-range effect of the holding on American compa-
nies' international business ventures in unstable countries warrants 
a watchful eye. 
John D. Bouchard 
30. Id. 
31. The court readily admitted Bell's total noncomplicity in any wrongdoing or breach 
under the contract. Id. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, Compiled and Edited by Nandasiri Jasentu-
liyana and Roy S.K. Lee, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publica-
tions, Inc., Alphen Aan Den Rijn: Sijthoff & Nvordhoff, 1979. Vol. 
I: Pp. xv, 479; Vol. II: Pp. xii, 550. 
Jasentuliyana's and Lee's MANUAL ON SPACE LAW consists of 
two volumes totaling over 1000 pages of texts and documents. Vol-
ume I is divided into two parts, dealing respectively with "principles 
of space law," i.e., the ten existing or emerging international space 
law agreements, and with "space agencies and institutions." Vol-
ume II contains the texts of existing or draft international agree-
ments in the field of space law, accompanied, where applicable, by 
a list of ratifications, signatures, accessions, a list of references to 
travaux preparatoires and a selected bibliography. 
Essentially Volume I is made up of contributions by individual 
authors, all with an excellent reputation in the field of space law or 
international law in general, and amongst whom many were closely 
involved in the actual drafting of the international agreements 
which they discuss. 1 As noted in the Foreword by Manfred Lachs, 
Judge in the International Court of Justice and an eminent author-
ity in the field of space law, 2 the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW is an 
"achievement in itself."3 With clarity and precision the authors 
discuss the existing status of what is now generally called the 
"corpus juris spatialis, "as it stands some ten years after the signing 
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 the charter of international space 
law. On purpose the two editors have kept editorial changes in the 
individual contributions to a minimum.5 With the high quality of 
the articles in question, this editorial policy does in no way diminish 
the value of the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW. What is regrettable, how-
ever, is that the editors have not seen it fit to write a more elaborate 
preface or an introductory chapter to volume I. The reader is, as it 
1. Contributors to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xv. (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL ON SPACE LAW]. 
2. Manfred Lachs is the author of THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE (1972) and is a former 
president of the International Court of Justice. 
3. Lachs, Forward to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xi. 
4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 
2410, T.I.A.S. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL 
ON SPACE LAW 1) [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty J. 
5. Jasentuliyana & Lee, Preface to 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW xiii. 
323 
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were, plunged into the details of the individual subjects without an 
adequate overall introduction to the general development of inter-
national space law and its institutions. 
Chapters I to IV of volume I contain largely descriptive studies 
of the four international space law agreements to date, which have 
been drawn up within the United Nations framework. All four in-
struments are based upon, and elaborate upon, the Declaration of 
Legal Principles Governing the. Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space Resolution, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1963.6 The Outer Space Treaty, 
opened for signature in 1967, is discussed in chapter F by Dembling. 
Readers can benefit from the author's intimate knowledge of the 
drafting history and the contents of the Outer Space Treaty, often 
called the cornerstone of international space law. No doubt the two 
most important principles enunciated by the treaty are: 
a) that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies 
shall be free from exploration and use by all States;8 and 
b) that no weapons of mass destruction shall be placed in earth 
orbit, in outer space and on celestial bodies. 11 
Amongst the other provisions of the treaty, many anticipate upon 
the three remaining United Nations space law agreements, which 
would be adopted subsequently.9·1 As noted by Dembling in his 
conclusion, the basic weakness of the treaty is the generality of its 
terms leaving "much to interpretation by the parties."10 
In chapter II, 11 Lee, one of the two editors of the MANUAL ON 
SPACE LAW, discusses the 1968 Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into 
Outer Space. 12 After an analysis of this largely technical instrument, 
6. G.A. Resolution 1962, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963) (text 
reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 373). 
7. Dembling, Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 
1. 
8. Id. at 9-12. 
9. Id. at 12-15. 
9.1. Since the publication of the Manual on Space Law and the writing of this comment 
the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has finalized a draft 
Moon Treaty. 
10. Id. at 35. 
11 . Lee, Assistance to and Return of Astronauts and Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON 
SPACE LAW 53. 
12. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
14
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the author concludes, amongst other things, that the agreement 
ought to be amended so as to require "launching authorities to make 
notification of spacecraft which is about to return to earth prema-
turely."13 Such an amendment could be useful in a case such as that 
of Cosmos 954, which reentered the earth's atmosphere and crashed 
in the Canadian Northwest Territories in January 1978. 14 
The third United Nations space law treaty, the Liability Con-
vention of 1972, 15 is dealt with at great length by Cheng in chapter 
IIl. 18 The main feature of this agreement is the principle of absolute 
liability of states for damage caused on earth by space objects. With 
his usual lucidity, Cheng, an outstanding specialist in both the 
fields of air and space law, 17 gives an excellent appraisal of the 
convention. As a postscript and as alluded to by Cheng, 111 the above-
mentioned crash of Cosmos 954 in Canada will be the first practical 
test to which the Liability Convention is put. 111 The fourth and last 
United Nations agreement, 19·1 the Registration Treaty of 1975,20 a 
largely technical instrument, is rather briefly discussed in chapter 
IV21 by Cocca of Argentina, who for many years has been associated 
with the works of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). 
Chapters V and VI of volume I deal with a number of interna-
tional instruments in the field of space telecommunications, which 
have been agreed upon outside the United Nations framework. In 
chapter V editor Jasentuliyana describes the detailed regulatory 
Objects launched into Outer Space, done April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.l.A.S. 6599, 672 
U.N.T.S. 119 (effective Dec. 3, 1968) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 9). 
13. Lee, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 73. 
14. Id.; see Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6 J. SPACE L. 
147 (1978). 
15. Convention on International Liability for Damage Cau'sed by Space Objects, done 
March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. 7762 (effective Oct. 9, 1973) (text reproduced at 2 
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 13) [hereinafter cited as the Liability Conventionj. 
16. Cheng, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL 
ON SPACE LAW 83. 
17. Bin Cheng is the author of THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT (1962) and is 
the Professor of Air and Space Law at London University and the Chairman of the Air Law 
Committee on the International Law Association. 
18. Cheng, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 84. 
19. See Dept. of External Affairs, Canadian Statement of Claim, Communique 8, Doc. 
FLA-268, Jan. 23, 1979. 
19.1. See, supra, footnote 9.1. 
20. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. 8480 (effective Sept. 15, 1976) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL 
ON SPACE LAW 23) [hereinafter cited as the Registration Treaty J. 
21. Cocca, Registration of Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 173. 
15
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work of the International Telecommunications Union (l.T.U.) and 
its World Administrative Radio ·Conferences (WARC) in the field of 
the "judicious control of the radio spectrum and the international 
standardization of frequency allocation."22 In the following chapter 
Schulze discusses the 1974 Brussels Convention on the Distribution 
of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, 23 reached 
within the framework of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIP0).2' This convention is essentially aimed at copyright 
protection but, unfortunately, does not cover broadcasts by so-
called direct broadcast satellites. 25 
Chapters VII to IX of volume I are individual studies of three 
subjects which have been on the working program of the United 
Nations COPUOS for many years, but on which the international 
communty has, as yet, not been able to reach agreement with a view 
to drafting conventions. These subjects are: legal principles relating 
to the moon, 26 to direct satellite broadcasting, 27 and to romote sen-
sing of the earth by satellites. 28 Perhaps a coincidence, the contribu-
tions to the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW on these three subjects are all 
Canadian ones. Matte, 211 director of McGill University's Institute of 
Air and Space Law, and Vlasic, 30 former director of that institute, 
write on, respectively, the Draft Moon Treaty31 and principles relat-
ing to remote sensing of the earth by satellites. Dalfen, Vice-
Chairman of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommuni-
cations Commission (CRTC), writes on direct broadcast satellites. 
All three authors refer to the present stalemate within COPUOS 
regarding these important subjects. With respect to the Draft Moon 
22. Jasentuliyana, Regulations Governing Space Telecommunication, in 1 MANUAL ON 
SPACE LAW 195, 195. 
23. Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signal Transmitted 
by Satellite, done May 21, 1974 (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 87). 
24. Schulze, The Distribution of Progamme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, 
in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 239. 
25. Id. at 245-46. 
26. Matte, Legal Principles Relating to the Moon, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 253. 
27. Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 283. 
28. Vlasic, Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 303. 
29. Nicholas M. Matte is the author of AEROSPACE LAW (1969) and AEROSPACE LAW FROM 
SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION TO COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION (1977), and is Director of the Centre of 
Research of Air and Space Law of McGill University. 
30. Vlasic is a co-author of M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, and I. Vlasic, LAW AND PUBLIC 
ORDER IN SPACE (1963), and is a Professor of Law at McGill University. 
31. Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196 Annex I (April 11, 1977) 
(text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 93) [hereinafter cited as the Draft Moon 
Treaty]. 
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Treaty the question of the utilization of the moon's natural re-
sources is the stumbling block;32 for direct satellite broadcasting, it 
is the conflict between the principle of freedom of information and 
State sovereignty over radio and television broadcasts;33 and for 
remote sensing of the earth by satellites, it is the problem of na-
tional sovereignty over information relating to natural resources.a" 
The last chapter of part one of volume I, chapter X, gives a 
survey of the numerous bilateral cooperation agreements between 
States in the field of space activities. 35 Most of these agreements 
were concluded between the United States36 and the Soviet Union:17 
on the one hand and third countries on the other. The chapter was 
written by Hosenball, General Counsel of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). 
Reviewing part one of volume I as a unity, one misses separate 
chapters on at least three topics which have recently attracted a 
great deal of attention in the world community: the status of the 
equatorial geostationary orbit, used by most communication satel-
lites and over which eight equatorial countries now claim sover-
eignty. 38 Also missing are chapters on the boundary between air 
space and outer space, and on the advent of solar energy satellites. 
The latter subject is quite new. The former is old and had become 
almost forgotten until, in 1978, the Soviet Union proposed an inter-
national agreement fixing the lower limit of outer space at 100 kilo-
meters above sea level. 
Part two of volume I deals with "space agencies and institu-
tions." Chapters Xl, 39 XIl,'0 XV,'1 and XVl,'2 written by Colino,"a 
32. Matte, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 264-70. See, also supra footnote 11.1. 
33. Dalfen, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 296. 
34. Vlasic, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 319-24. 
35. Hosenball, Bilateral Agreements, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 347. 
36. Id. at 347-51. 
37. Id. at 351-54. 
38. For the declaration of these eight countries, the so-called Bogota Declaration, see 
Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 383. 
For a discussion of the geostationary orbit within the framework of the l.T.U., see Jasentuli-
yana, 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 220-23. 
39. Colino, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INT ELSA 1'), in 
1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 363. 
40. Kolossov, International Organization of Space Communications (INTER-
SPUTNIK), in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 401. 
41. Jasentuliyana, The International Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT), in 1 
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 401. 
42. Gorove, The Arab Corporation for Space Communications (ARABSA T), in 1 MANUAL 
ON SPACE LAW 467. 
43. Richard R. Colino is Vice-President and Manager of INTELSAT. 
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Kolossov, 44 Jasentuliyana, 45 and Gorove, 46 respectively, describe four 
international organizations in the field of space telecommuni-
cations: INTELSAT, the space telecommunications organization of 
the western world; INTERSPUTNIK, its eastern counterpart; 
INMARSAT, a specialized organization for maritime space tele-
communications; and ARABSAT, an emerging regional telecom-
munication satellite organization amongst the member nations of 
the Arab League. Of these four organizations, the Washington-
based INTELSAT is definitely the most important and largest one. 
Chapters XIII47 and XIV, 48 written by Vereshchetin 411 and Kalte-
necker, 50 discusses two regional organizations for space activities 
in general, the East European INTERCOSMOS and the western 
European Space Agency (ESA). Strangely lacking in part two of 
volume I is a separate chapter on the United Nations COPUOS, 
which after all is the forum through which most international space 
law agreements have arisen. A study of COPUOS could have been 
particularly useful and enlightening at a time when the commit-
tee, which so far has worked with a rule of unanimous consent, is 
unable to reach agreement on such important matters as the Moon 
Treaty, 50 · 1 direct satellite broadcasting and remote sensing. 
As mentioned earlier, volume II contains the texts of existing 
or draft international agreements in the field of space law, accompa-
nied, where applicable, by a list of ratifications, signatures, acces-
sions, a list of references to travaux preparatoires and a selected 
bibliography. The list of references to the travaux preparatories is 
especially invaluable. 51 The selected bibliography52 is thorough, but 
is in no way a replacement for Li's bibliography.53 The very recent 
44. Yuri M. Kolossov is Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet 
Union. 
45. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana is Political Affairs Officer of the Outer Space Affairs Divi-
sion of the U.N. Secretariat and Deputy Secretary of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. 
46. Stephen Gorove is Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi and Editor-in-
Chief of the JOURNAL or SPACE LAW. 
47. Vereshchetin, Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful 
Purposes (INTERCOSMOS), in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 415. 
48. Kaltenecker, The European Space Agency (ESA), in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 427. 
49. Vladlen S. Vereshchetin is Vice-Chairman of INTERCOSMOS. 
50. Hans Kaltenecker is the former director of the legal bureau of the European Space 
Agency. 
50.1. See supra footnote 9.1. 
51. Travaux Preparatoires, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 455. 
52. Selected Bibliography, in 2 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 527. 
53. K.W. Li, WORLD WIDE SPACE LAW BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978). 
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Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of the Remote Sensing 
of the Earth From Outer Space54 stands somewhat alone in the 
MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, since, because of its very recent date, it is 
not discussed in volume I. 
Overall, the MANUAL ON SPACE LAW is a reflection of existing 
international space law, and forms with its articles and texts an 
excellent study book and reference work. 
P .P. C. HAAN APPEL* 
54. Convention on the Transfer and Use of Data of the Remote Sensing of the Earth 
From Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/33/162 (June 29, 1978) (text reproduced at 2 MANUAL ON 
SPACE LAW 367. 
This convention was signed between the Soviet Union and a number of East European 
countries. 
• Associate Professor of Law, McGill University. 
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